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Abstract 
Cyprus Dispute is considered to be one of the oldest unresolved disputes. However, 
in recent year, it is believed that there is a hope that it can be resolved. This paper 
is a conflict assessment of the dispute, and it gives a brief historical background, 
and discusses the position of the actors involved; and whether their positions can 
drive or mitigate the conflict. It touches upon the dividers and connectors of the 
conflict, which if dealt with carefully, can lead to an optimal solution. The paper 
gives an overall picture of the conflict, and discusses the possibilities in future. 
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After the painful Abyssinian lesson, early twentieth century Italy 
under Giolitti was little inclined to engage in further adventures 
overseas. Historical memory and the need to find outlets for its 
industrial goods and emigrants, however, required Italy to re-launch 
its imperialist objectives and a corresponding international economic 
policy especially in the Mediterranean and the Orient. Putting this 
political program into practice meant engaging in good relations with 
Germany on one hand and Russia and France on the other. In the 
Balkans and the Orient it meant coming up principally against the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, which presented a potential obstacle. The 
Yugoslav political situation, which Italy necessarily had to adjust to, 
implied a rapprochement between Serbia and Russia, blocking 
Austria’s route to Salonica, tending to exclude Albania and block its 
access to the Adriatic. It was thus decidedly anti-Austrian and 
consequently likely to put a chill on the Triple Alliance. Italy’s 
history and affinities could thus find support in Europe and outside 
the Triple Alliance only from the two “friendly” though non-allied 
nations of Russia and France. As far as England was concerned, Italy 
did not break off those friendly relations which acted as a 
counterweight to rapprochement with France. The Italian 
government knew that England could not do without her and her 
ports for its Mediterranean fleet but as Italy had now given up her 
imperialist ambitions in the Red Sea and accepted the fait accompli 
in Tunisia she had no further need of England for the success of her 
projects in Tripolitania and the Orient but did need France. Italian 
diplomacy thus prepared her favourable international contingencies 
with a covert chess board of alliances, understandings and 
friendships.  
Part of the Italian press was favourable to the control of the 
Adriatic which it saw as something resembling an inland lake (mare 
nostrum) while philanthropic bodies whose purpose was the 
promotion of Italian language and culture, such as the Dante 
Alighieri Society, demanded that territories like Malta in which the 
Italian language was still spoken alongside local languages should be 
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reunited with the homeland. Whatever the choices and calculations 
made of political opportunities, some of the alliances of convenience 
which Italy sought were downright contradictory. In addition to the 
difficulties already mentioned in maintaining the Triple Alliance 
whilst attempting to combat Austrian influence in the Balkans, 
Italian diplomacy was also intent on moving closer to Russia and, at 
the same time, aimed to undermine the Balkan balance of power and 
destroy the status quo guaranteed by the Austro-Russian agreement. 
It relied on England to keep the peace in the Mediterranean and at the 
same time planned to invade Tripolitania with the connivance of 
France. It backed radical-socialist France for secularisation and its 
struggle against the Holy See and, at the same time, tried to avoid 
provoking religious conflict in Italy where it was also looking for a 
conciliatory approach aimed at containing the demands of the 
workers’ movement. These were the main elements which Italy’s 
malleable policy was attempting to bring together and which German 
Chancellor von Bűlow defined with ironic disdain as a “little waltz”. 
When in September 1911, then, hostilities between the Italian 
kingdom and the Ottoman Empire began, even the usually well-
informed foreign observers expressed surprise bordering on 
disapproval. The Italian government had exceeded European 
diplomatic expectations. The causes of the war were not related to 
prior difficulties between Italy and Turkey and in fact had very little 
to do with the two warring sides themselves. The Italian government 
had been subjected to external pressure. Having found out that 
Turkey was preparing to rent out a port on the Cyrenaica to a 
German company, England planned to occupy the threatened port if 
Italy did not hastily apply the rights granted it by the agreement 
signed in 1902 with France and ratified by the English government. 
This explains Germany’s patent disillusionment at the outbreak of 
hostilities, considering that in Tripolitania and Cirenaica the country 
would have liked to have a distinctive influence. The same position 
was understood by Viennese newspaper Die Zeit which, speaking of 
Italian intentions in northern Africa, looked forward to the military 
invasion being Tripoli integrated part of the Ottoman territory. 
Germany should have mislead Italy in proceeding with projects in 
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that region. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy’s point of view could 
have not been different from the German one, “since from an Italian 
action in Tripolitania severe international complications could have 
emerged”(Die Zeit,22September 1911)1. 
Whilst expected, significant increase in French power in the 
Mediterranean unsettled Giolitti and the bourgeoisie. The occupation 
of Tripoli had thus become crucial to the strategic defence of Italy. 
An understanding of what was happening requires taking into 
account the delicate Italian political balance of power and the 
psychological pressures exerted on it by public opinion although this 
is hard to demonstrate. In July 1911 Italy’s domestic status quo was 
shaken up. Inspired by the country’s fiftieth anniversary celebrations 
people were showing signs of discontent with the petty machinations 
of parliamentary politics and sought in vain for the heirs to the great 
Risorgimento heroes whose valiant exploits were currently being 
exalted. Parliament was experiencing an equally chaotic phase with 
the Socialists, lured in and constrained by the government but 
holding the balance of power nonetheless, and a disoriented and 
insecure Liberal-Monarchist majority attempting to keep hold of 
Giolitti whilst jettisoning his program. 
Italian expansion in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was extremely 
popular with the Nationalists who considered this future colony a 
sort of “promised land”2. To say nothing of the writers who were 
then praising Imperialism and the concept of the white man’s 
civilization mission (D’Annunzio, Marinetti, Corradini). For them 
the North Africa adventure was to demonstrate that the Italians 
deserved their national status. Even poet Giovanni Pascoli, on 
November 1911, greeted this imperialist adventure enthusiastically in 
                                                          
1 The same position, contrary to any Italian action in Libya, appeared in another 
Viennese newspaper (Neue Freie Presse,23 September 1911). Giuseppe Avarna Duke of 
Gualtieri, meticulous Italian ambassador in Vienna, will send copies of such papers to the 
Foreign Ministry Antonino di San Giuliano.  
2 If certain scholars are to be believed, even the Second Congress of Italians Abroad 
held in Rome in June 1911 emerged as a clear nationalist success with the latter represented 
by Guglielmo Marconi, Giulio De Frenzi (Luigi Federzoni), Giovanni Preziosi, Amy 
Allemand Bernardy and other esteemed exponents of the conservative faction (Manzotti, 
1969, p. 210; Monina, 2002, pp. 216-217). 
51 
 
 
his prose essay La grande proletaria si è mossa, as L’Idea 
Nazionale(11 April 1912) reminisces in its eulogy in his honour 
authoritative body of the nationalists in whose ranks had landed in 
mature age after having belonged to socialism. The same roman 
paper observes that , since the beginning of the expedition in 
Tripolitania and Cirenaica, various Italians living abroad, “from the 
greatest to the most dark ones, wanted to offer their new homeland 
something of their belonging. All, from Guglielmo Marconi, who ran 
to implant along our fourth bank powerful radio telegraph stations, to 
immigrant farmers in America, heard the beauty of this historic hour 
and, if they couldn’t risk their life as the youngest and strongest, they 
offered intellect and money” (L’Idea nazionale, 1 February 1912).  
In general, the conquest of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was 
regarded favourably by right wing conservatives, the banking and 
industrial worlds, reformist Socialists (Leonida Bissolati) and the 
Maximalist faction. There were also a significant number of 
Catholics who saw occupation of these regions as a way of 
Christianising an area still embroiled in the slave trade. The Banco di 
Roma, which belonged to the Vatican, also had an important branch 
in Tripoli. It has, however, recently been clarified, that Pope Pius X 
generally and personally called for greater moderation from certain 
high-ranking prelates and resident bishops who had expressed 
support for the colonial wars in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica3. The 
Republican Party was divided on the subject of the attack between 
pro and anti-Tripoli factions and it was left to the revolutionary left 
(with Benito Mussolini and others) to express the fiercest opposition 
to the government in the name of Socialist pacifism and aversion to 
Imperialist wars. This latter attitude was echoed by intellectual 
Gaetano Salvemini for whom this African area was no more than a 
                                                          
3The Libya adventure was sometimes presented by part of the clergy and a certain 
Catholic culture as a sacred war (Lettera di Attilio Simonetti, segretario della Società 
Antischiavista d’Italia, Montefano di Macerata, 26 settembre 1911, in Archivio storico 
diplomatico del Ministero degli Esteri [from now on = ASD], Ministero Africa italiana, vol. 
II, 1859-1945, pos. 104/1). This stance was condemned in no uncertain terms by the Holy 
See, and by the Pope in particular, with the latter heading off any potential doubts on the 
matter by publishing a letter of reprimand of these misleading interpretations in the 
Osservatore Romano (Sale, 2011, pp. 61-70). 
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“box of sand”. In these months a number of newspapers which 
rejected the government’s propaganda (such as L’Avantior L’Asino) 
published satirical vignettes highlighting the futility of the war. So 
thought also newspaper such as La Voce and L’Unità, even if this last 
one tried to gain advantage from military expenses – often useless – 
that enabled the army to show their real action abilities always in 
doubt. While maintaining a political and moral judgment strongly 
opposed to the activity, the paper directed by Salvemini since the 
first issue, was confident in the ability of soldiers - as they were the 
ones responsible to battle and to give good evidence in battle - in the 
hope that the country could however, leave with honour as soon as 
possible: “Since this war Italy, already participating, must obtain 
every possible advantage; and one of these benefits shall be acquired, 
and has so far been obtained, fortunately for us, from physical skill 
tests, discrete military organization, good national framework given 
from our people”(L’Unità, 16 December1911)4. Words that create 
reaction of the sheet of the left reformists Avanti that saw in that 
statement “a Nietzschean and nationalistic defence of the war’s 
usefulness to war for the sole prestige bought in the value of 
deployment and dexterity”(L’Unità,30December 1911). 
But apart from these discordant voices, almost the entirety of the 
political class and the great national newspapers supported the 
occupation of the new colony which was given its ancient Roman 
name, Libya, from 1934 onwards. At the end of lengthy diplomatic 
efforts by Foreign Affairs Minister Antonino di San Giuliano, in the 
summer of 1911 Giolitti accepted the Italo-Turkish war as “historically 
inevitable” if Italy were not to miss her chance of obtaining one of the 
last available colonies5. At this stage of “soul spring” and national 
interests, deputies and senators had momentarily set aside the issues of 
wide or narrow suffrage, thinking only about the hoped enterprise on 
                                                          
4 On the opposition newspaper L’Unità and The Voice the war of Libya see also 
Marmiroli, 2013, pp. 1004-1012. 
5 In actual fact Giolitti justified his imperialist ambitions on humanitarian rather than 
nationalist grounds (Giolitti, 1922, pp. 333-334). This was also the standpoint of Pasquale 
Turiello, the greatest theorist of Italian imperialism, who considered conquering colonies to 
be of vital importance to Italy and complained that no action had as yet been taken to 
arrange this (Molinelli, 1988, p. 302). 
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Mediterranean beaches of Africa. As for Vittorio Emanuele III, 
without wanting to resize all government positions held by the 
minister of the war Paul Spingardi, he remained the most authoritative 
representative of the army: he was the sovereign, therefore, who gave 
the final approval, following then constantly evolving Libyan entire 
enterprise. For this reason, the newspaper L’Idea Nazionale, usually 
restrictive and careful for superlatives and descriptive exuberance, 
could only observe: “Greetings from the Kings to a part of the 
expeditionary force troops has given the most solemn consecration to 
the great enterprise about a settled Italy, now truly awake” (L’Idea 
nazionale, 12 October 1911). 
The singing of patriotic songs - reminiscing chronicles of the time 
- a whole population accompanied soldiers to railway stations, docks: 
“In Naples, Bari, Messina; like Pisa, Milan, Turin, as in Rome, real 
capital today, these days will remain memorable. It is useless to 
recall the processions of thousands of people through the jubilant 
city, and the popular enthusiasm overflowing, and railway stations 
filled up to capacity, also on top of train roofs, of delirious people, 
eager to accompany firstly with their eyes and then with their heart, 
those who left. Those who were there - and who was not? – will keep 
indelible memories to soothe the pain of future meanness and 
cowardice” (L’Idea nazionale, 12 October 1911). It was intense, 
exaggerated, naive and folksy patriotism, like the “Tripoli beautiful 
saying of love” (Molinelli, 1966, pp. 317-318). 
After a number of skirmishes in Tripoli, on the 29September Italy 
declared war on Turkey6 as the nation ruling Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. An Expeditionary Force led by General Carlo Caneva 
(1845-1922) landed in the second half of October and rapidly 
occupied the most important coastal towns from Tripoli to Benghazi 
as far as Tobruk on the Egyptian border without, however, pushing 
inland. The army’s lack of preparation - it had not received the 
necessary prior warning from the diplomats - and excessive optimism 
soon became clear. Despite the fact that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
had been a fixed objective of Italian foreign policy for decades, 
                                                          
6 Exactly at 2,30 p.m. (showed on Comunicato Agenzia Stefani, Rome 29 September 
1911, in ASD, Affari Politici 1891-1916, serie P, b. 13). 
54 
 
 
neither the region’s tribal society nor its geography had been 
sufficiently researched. After these initial successes, in fact, the war 
degenerated as a result of difficult terrain and resistance from its 
peoples who rebelled against occupation and launched a full-blown 
guerrilla war against Italy inflicting severe losses: 3,431 dead of 
whom 1,483 in fighting and 1,948 as a result of contagious diseases 
caught in the region. Turkish-Arab losses, however, were much 
heavier, at around 14,800 dead.  
To block Turkish supplies to the region, cut the war short and 
drive the Ottoman Empire in the direction of peace, the Italian 
military command proposed to shift its sphere of action. The Italian 
Navy was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean where it occupied a 
number of Aegean islands called the Dodecanese - the name given to 
the twelve islands which the Italian government promised to return to 
Turkey when the latter withdrew its forces from the whole of Libya - 
and Commander Enrico Millo even undertook a raid in the 
Dardanelles straits with five torpedo boats on 18 and 19 July 1912 to 
demonstrate to Turkey that not even Constantinople was safe. 
Worried by the proximity of the Italian forces the Turkish 
government agreed to the peace negotiations which lead to a pact in 
Ouchy ratified by the Treaty of Lausanne (18 October 1912) giving 
up control over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica7, territories to which Italy 
had in any case already extended its sovereignty without waiting for 
international recognition. To guarantee recognition of its new 
possessions Italy also kept hold of the Dodecanese islands until 1947. 
Even though the Italian parliament was not convened in September 
1911 to ratify the declaration of war, Italian morale was, however, 
hugely raised by this successful colonial venture whose importance 
was underlined by the establishment of a specific Ministry for the 
                                                          
7 In the following months an Arab correspondent will comment - from Rome - the first 
page of an Egyptian newspaper (Al-Ahram,4April1913), in very favorable terms for Italy, 
the real extent of the Lausanne Treaty, so as to remove any illusion to the Ottomans. Refer 
also to Lettera dell’Agenzia diplomatica di S.M. il Re d’Italia al Ministro delle Colonie, 
Cairo 6 April 1913, in ASD, Ministero Africa italiana, vol. II, 1859-1945, pos. 172/1.  
In fact, in the ambiguous Treaty of Lausanne, the sultan, in order to maintain link 
between the people of Libya and Turkey, refused to recognize the sovereignty, hinting to 
those North African regions that he granted them political autonomy.  
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Colonies on 20 November 1912 n.1205, by Hon. Pietro Bertolini. In 
this ministry not only will merge the duties performed until now by 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry for the territories passed under the 
sovereignty or protection of Italy, but also the Italian Colonial 
Institute, as confirmed by Giolitti to Di San Giuliano, thus leaving 
the new Pontifical Council full freedom of decision with regards to 
the initiatives to be undertaken in Libya8. 
The positive implications of the war were thus noted in several 
ways with varying impact and motivations as the letter sent by 
Senator Pasquale Villari in November 1912 to Arcangelo Ghisleri, 
the then director of the Republican newspaper La Ragione9, on the 
subject of the criticisms directed at him by the strongly anti-war 
Socialist Filippo Turati who kept his original opinion on the matter 
as shows:  
 
Dear Director, 
Allow me to make a brief statement. I see that the Hon. Turati, responding to 
the Corriere della Sera in Critica Sociale, reiterates the assertions made by him in 
the Milanese City Council on the subject of an article of mine published last 24 
October in the Corriere. In this article I set out the criticisms of those who were 
and are opposed to the Libyan war and added that, leaving to one side the 
hyperbole used in such debates and conceding a certain element of truth in them, 
the undeniable fact remained that the war was necessary, inevitable and supported 
with great enthusiasm by the vast majority of the Italian people. It raised the 
nation’s self-esteem and its image abroad. In just a few months it contributed more 
to the political unification of Italy than anything else in many long years of peace 
had done. With expressions of considerable formal courtesy Hon. Turati argues 
that by not explicitly denying my adversaries’ criticisms I implicitly accepted 
them. He thus attributes me with the opinions of my adversaries and states that I 
have engaged in the harshest criticisms of the war when what I have actually done 
is to demonstrate its historical and national value. “The certain fact”, they write, is 
that a profound sentiment was developing in the country that this war would result 
in definitive nation building, in a new, great Italy recognised by all. Our soldiers 
                                                          
8Lettera del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri al Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Rome 
30 July 1912, in ASD, Affari Politici 1891-1916,serie P, b. 14. 
9 Ghisleri had also been an opponent of the Libyan war from 1911 and had thus clashed 
with certain members of the PRI although his opinion later changed and he abandoned his 
pacifist and anti-nationalist stance from 1914 onwards in favour of interventionism.  
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set off as new crusaders, acclaimed by the people who carried them on their 
shoulders10. 
 
Totally unexpected, however, the statements - which troubled not 
just slightly the Italian front - issued by Giustino Fortunato and the 
Republican Napoleone Colajanni, who had continuously and strongly 
opposed the shipment of Tripoli. While siding in favour of neutrality, 
Senator Fortunato justified the military action since it had become 
inescapable: 
 
 Who more than I contrary to colonial adventures, and generally to war? Who 
more dubious, more timid than I of the new Italy? Who better than me is certain 
that Tripoli will be a fruitless enterprise, perilous and costly, even when necessary, 
and fatal? Well long live the war, though now clear that fifty years of national life 
were not vain, and something new, beautiful, promising is in the new Italy!... (Di 
Staso, 1912, p. 12). 
 
Beyond shades and attitudes of intellectuals, few among democrats 
shared the exclamation of the famous southern Italian (“Long live the 
war”), even though agreeing with him that the war experience, for the 
first time after the Italy’s union, had revealed a new and beneficial 
national spirit. Along the lines of Fortunato, but more complex and 
perhaps for this reason most appreciated, the conclusion of Colajanni’s 
speech appeared in all newspapers of Italy, in which he emphasized 
the importance of the undertaking in North Africa thanks to which he 
had been able to regain some confidence in the army, proving Europe 
and the world organization, discipline and value of the Italian 
people(C. Maranelli, in L’Unità, 5October1912).  
Moreover even Salvemini had to admit that the Italian troops in 
Libya were united not only by the danger but also by the feeling of 
national duty and honor, and that in this respect to the country they 
were all in agreement, as well as all watched with sympathy the 
“magnificent solidarity in the war” (G. Salvemini [reply letter to 
Carlo Maranelli], in L’Unità, 5 October1912).This was basically the 
                                                          
10Letter from Pasquale Villari to Arcangelo Ghisleri, [s. l.], November, 1912, in 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Villari correspondence, b. 71. Villari was referring in 
particular to Filippo Turati's article in Critica Sociale, XXII, nn. 21-22, 1-16 November, 
1912. On this debate see P. Villari in Corriere della Sera, 24 October 1912. 
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best result achieved by the company, admitted even by those who 
were averse to it, which ended with cheer, while remaining solemnly 
contrary. A rare and wide “harmony” which, with several distinctions 
from the political point of view, was obtained by giving proof of 
seriousness, in front of a company initially justified by the lure of 
great wealth to be conquered without fight, although the cost of the 
war in terms of human life and money was high and the material 
benefits low. It was in any case defined by Benedetto Croce and 
Gaetano Mosca in sentimental terms as a demonstration of national 
vigour. The judgment of the two famous intellectuals is confirmed by 
the debate emerged in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the 
kingdom after the suspension of work in both houses of Parliament 
(10 July 1911). Simply just remember the words of praise for the 
armed forces pronounced in the courtroom by the President of the 
Chamber Giuseppe Marcora 22 February1912 - after a parliamentary 
recess of more than seven months because of the war - which roused 
vivid, general and sustained applause. From his seat he reopened the 
shareholders’ meeting: 
 
If, in fact, the firm’s first start, to which the Government has set to protect 
dignity and interests of Italy, the unanimous consent of thoughts and intentions 
manifested in every region and in every class of citizens - not without astonishment 
and surprise of those who do not yet know the soul of our race - revealed to the 
civilized world that the new Italian lives, not only in the miraculous awakening of 
its material energies, but also in its unity and moral discipline, the admirable 
conduct of our soldiers and sailors has proven that it has become the formidable 
defence of the conscience and the mutual will of an entire people. [...] As we are 
now, we will always be; in harmony and ready for any sacrifice for the honour and 
greatness of Italy. This is, ladies and gentlemen, our duty. Et sit nobis in animo 
constantia! (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 22February1912, p. 17140). 
 
Equally strong appreciation appeared the next day, when the 
prime minister and interior minister Giolitti announced on November 
5, 1911 Royal Decree n. 1247 by which the Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica were placed under the full and entire sovereignty of the 
Italian Kingdom and once again the hall resounded with unanimous 
applause. Same thing happened with the rapporteur of the 
Commission, Mr. Ferdinando Martini, who, again on February 23, 
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1912, asked colleagues to vote without delay the aforementioned 
decree converting it into law, because “what was act of government 
is surely the will of the nation” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 
1912, p. 17144). 
Statements that hid a dangerous presumption perhaps chauvinistic, 
which is supported by far more extreme expansionist theories would 
then have disoriented public opinion by pushing the country toward 
irreparable follies. However, in the name of a higher patriotic 
conception almost all political parties represented in parliament put 
aside all internal differences reaffirming confidence on the measures 
submitted by the Government regarding the war, albeit with several 
distinctions. Congressman Sidney Sonnino - albeit by constitutional 
opposition benches - asked that the decree vote, he declared he would 
have approve, is proposed to bring together maximum consensus of 
votes, “because the Assembly’s voice would express the will of the 
country” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17145). 
The broad consensus on voting - also given by those who remained 
firm against Libya – grew from the general belief of serving a good 
and useful cause for Italy. While other deputies as Leonidas Bissolati 
motivated favourable thought of a part of the Socialist parliamentary 
minority group claiming primarily the political opportunity of their 
choice, “not to bring the Socialist Party and the working classes to 
isolate themselves in a hostile attitude to the rest of the Nation...”(AP, 
CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17153). 
For the first time after Italy’s unity was managing to conquer 
territories beyond the national border and the effort to achieve 
purpose was not only military, but had assumed an increasingly 
“civilian” and even beneficial distinctiveness, as said by Mr. Giulio 
Alessio, chief of the radical party, which, in giving the membership 
of its parliamentary group to its approach to the Government will 
declare:  
 
We know that the mixture of races and the fruitful example of the institutions 
of economic freedom are the most effective means to release the populations’ 
retreats for those subject to their average economic age. Our mission, therefore, is 
unquestionably a civilizing mission(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 
17159). 
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Incredibly hostile to the conversion into law of the decree on the 
sovereignty of Italy in Libya was the reformist socialist Filippo 
Turati, who, while appreciating the heroism and sacrifice of the 
soldiers who fought under the national flag, declared that the 
purported national consensus was based on a serious 
misunderstanding, namely that “ardor that unites all of us for the 
good and for the honour of the homeland” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 
February 1912, p. 17164). 
Equally dubious - in the opinion of the Republican Eugene 
Church - were the words pronounced by the Foreign Ministry 
Antonio Di San Giuliano in his speech in Parliament of December 2 
1910: “The Tripolitania must remain Turkish”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 
23 February 1912, p. 17170).Other similar statements of Di San 
Giuliano of 9 June 1911 were always given by Mr. Church – lined up 
against African shipping and against its annexation decree - on the 
basis of the official account: “Our policy, like the one of other 
powers, has as its base the maintenance of the territorial status quo 
and the integrity of the Ottoman empire” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 
February 1912, p. 17170).Foreign Minister’s statements- 
contradictory according to Republican Congressman - must be 
placed to the entire diplomatic and military planning of time, 
considering the changes in the international scenario and the 
government’s foreign policy, which had been unable to resist that 
“historical inevitability”, according to the prior definition of Giolitti, 
the strengthening of the Italian position in the Mediterranean, which 
took the same leader of Dronero to have to wear in a few months the 
role of “man of war”. A matter of prestige for Italy, which also 
weakened the opposition of the newborn nationalist political 
movement and which also allowed industry and finance to expand 
their markets through the colonial expansion. An additional 
motivation was provided by the socialist Enrico Ferri, who, though 
ideally opposed to any war, will specify in a speech to the Chamber 
of Deputies: “I cannot, however, forget the historical law, so that 
every civilized nation, drew a degree of economic and political 
development, inevitably passes through the colonial expansion 
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phase”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17175). For many 
members of parliament, therefore, the Libyan enterprise was an 
inescapable destiny, the same as in the nineteenth century had 
England, Belgium, France, Germany and Japan, and that in 1911-12 
became Italy’s fate. Such shades of favourable vote with united 
nationalist leanings that Ferri gave to the decree, reaffirming those 
“new destinies of the people of Italy” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 
February 1912,p. 17176)11, led him to submit his resignation from 
the PSI few weeks later. 
The war of Tripoli, not only Ferri but for the majority of 
politicians, was understood as a “not pleasant but urgent need of 
Italian history” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17175) to 
establish itself on the international stage, as always present ib its 
meeting of February 23 1912, the Republican congressman Salvatore 
Barzilai, who fully agreed on the usefulness of signing the decree of 
sovereignty(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17175). 
Even he, for proclaiming sovereignty over Tripoli arguing with 
Filippo Turati, will pay his utterances with the output from the PRI 
(Colapietra, 1970, p. 27). Not all opposition deputies granted their 
vote for so-called “interests of the homeland”. For example, the Hon. 
Ettore Ciccotti, the only member of the South that expressly declared 
not to vote this decree, was not convinced by the regained prestige, 
honour, dignity, that were caused to the country with the conquest of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, 
p. 17151). Ciccotti will report directly to the President of the Council 
Giolitti, closing the general debate at the applauses, sure of the fact 
that on these issues even opposing parties, constantly in opposition, 
had put aside their internal differences aware of the need to set aside, 
given the circumstances, the political ideas for a higher interest of 
national order(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17178). 
And so, despite some critical comments made during the debate, the 
result of the roll call vote on the Royal Decree of 5 November 1911 
                                                          
11 Remaining on the theme of “destiny», we remember the study of a well-known 
orientalist of the early twentieth century on the discovery of an Arabic manuscript which 
reproduced a prophecy concerning the conquest of Tripolitania by Italy (Pacha, 1912, pp. 
15-45). 
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n. 1247 - by which the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under the full 
sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy, also taking into account the 
pressure of the national will - was largely favourable to Giolitti who 
managed to make it into law. 
In subsequent rounds of the Chamber of Deputies patriotic 
statements took it in turns with many polemical remarks, voice of 
two deputies of the Socialist Party, as if to emphasize the divisions 
within their own party. Mr. Giuseppe Di Stefano Neapolitans, a 
member of the Democratic Left, 28 February 1912 was sent “to all 
those brave heroes who fight in the name of Italy and who hold high 
the banner of the Fatherland in those lands, which were so much a 
part of the Empire that Rome had in the world, an applause greeting, 
gratitude and affection”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 28 February 1912, p. 
17328). In name of the socialist opposition on March 11, deputy 
Giulio Casalini, who already had expressed his dissent to the Libyan 
company voted by Parliament, believed that the huge sums spent on 
the war should have been used in the noblest works and production- 
reclamation, migration of peoples of the South, etc. -(AP, CD, leg. 
XXIII, 11March1912,pp. 17863-17866). 
Testimonials unanimously in favour of “Italian patriotic soul” 
exempt from any discussion and distinction could be understood 
from soldiers’ letters. They were sometimes ungrammatical, but it 
showed the sincerity, strength and faith in the country: for the 
fighters was a joy to see their writings in newspapers, not so much 
for the human desire but more for the interest of reading ones name, 
to share and maybe seek relief in the “new family” of the army or 
navy at that difficult time they were crossing (Il Giornale d’Italia,25 
January1912)12. The Il Giornale d’Italia, for example, reported 
deliberately highlighted in bold letter to a corporal who thanked the 
director of the magazine for having sent its fighters of the Ain Zara - 
where he too was - a copy of the same newspaper (Il Giornale 
d’Italia, 21 January 1912). 
                                                          
12In another newspaper was hoped to collect letters of soldiers in anthologies to spread 
amongst young people “manly education» as an alternative to “funny affectation or feminine 
discomforts so prevalent today in our schools” (P.S., in L’Idea nazionale, 6 December 
1911).  
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But the military occupation of the new colony- between 1912 and 
1913 welcomed by the European press, the Petit Niҫois (22August 
1912) to the London Times13, as well as Consulates, legations and the 
Italian Embassies around the world14 - we know that it did not bring 
economic and occupational benefits which many had expected. In 
exchange for the treaty, Italy made a generous - and risky - 
concession to Turkey allowing it to retain its religious jurisdiction in 
Libya through a representative, who would have had to live on the 
African colony and thus, within certain limits, have a voice in 
political and judicial affairs by the end of 1911 and early 1912 some 
daily newspapers and specialised press were highlighting the need to 
renew the civil and penal judicial framework in Tripolitana and 
Cyrenaica: “a very serious and important matter and one for which 
an immediate, in the true sense of the word, solution must be found” 
(Rivista di emigrazione, V. 1-2, 1912, p. 59)15. It was now, in fact, 
seen as an anachronistic judicial body in Western terms requiring 
reform in human terms to free it from the irrational prejudices 
inherent in local traditions. It was an extremely complex task, as the 
Rivista di emigrazione noted: “this organisation is in fact rendered 
more difficult by the fact that, in this branch of civil life in particular, 
the Turks have left us a legacy of shameful measures and 
deliberations which make necessary a veritable “step by step” 
conquest of peoples and contexts used to viewing judges as vulgar 
grace or sentence vendors, for Italian justice too” (Rivista di 
emigrazione, V. 1-2, 1912, p. 59). 
Without offending local and more generally Arab sensibilities, 
what was thus needed was to convince the Muslims living in Libya 
that justice was to be dispensed in the name of the King of Italy and 
under the jurisdiction of the Italian magistrate deputed to the post, 
leaving religious leaders jurisdiction over family law, faith based and 
civil matters relating to disputes worth no more than 500 lire. 
                                                          
13Whose articles 4, 5, 6, September 1913 were even reported to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Ambassador in London (see the correspondence in fasc. “Stampa estera”, in ASD, 
Ministero Africa italiana, vol. II, 1859-1945, pos. 172/1). 
14 See documentation kept in ASD, Affari Politici 1891-1916, serie P, b. 14.  
15 On the review cited see Orazi, 2015. 
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Prefects, courts and the Court of Appeal were to have jurisdiction 
over all other matters. This was, ultimately, the only way to make the 
control inherent in a conquest felt.  
As far as Italy was concerned, its new international status 
prompted it not only to offer an alternative to mass emigration, 
which was then mainly moving to the Americas, but also to revitalise 
its economy, seeking more intense trading links with the Orient, 
initially with China and then, even more emphatically, with Russia 
(especially the Caucasus), a market which was accorded significant 
importance after the conquest of the Dodecanese islands. The same 
Rivista di emigrazione mentioned above noted, in 1917, that “Italian 
exporters inclined to invest in those lands will certainly not regret the 
time and money expended and will soon be compensated by 
significant profits” (Rivista di emigrazione, X, 7-8-9, 1917, pp. 81-
93). 
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